claude-code-best/src/utils/sessionStoragePortable.ts
Dosion c2ac9a74c1
fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely (#361)
* fix: harden ACP communication boundaries

Harden ACP communication boundaries

Remote ACP sessions now cannot widen permission mode through untrusted
metadata or client payloads. WebSocket ACP ingress measures payloads by bytes
before binary decode, and prompt queue handoff keeps exactly one prompt active
while queued prompts are drained FIFO.

Constraint: ACP remote clients must not be able to open bypassPermissions without local launch intent
Constraint: WebSocket payload limits must be byte-based and checked before binary decode
Rejected: Keep promptToQueryContent wrapper | no production consumers remained after prompt conversion single-sourcing
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not re-enable remote bypassPermissions from _meta unless a local launch gate is verified in both acp-link and agent
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS/acp-link prompt queue, bridge, permission, payload, and prompt conversion tests; bun run typecheck; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual live ACP/RCS session against an external client

* fix: restore repository verification gates

Keep the full repository test, typecheck, build, and Biome lint gates usable
after the ACP fix pass. This commit is intentionally separate from the ACP
behavior change: it fixes Windows-safe Langfuse home redaction, removes stale
lint suppressions, resolves Biome warning/info diagnostics, and keeps env
expansion tests explicit without template-placeholder lint noise.

Constraint: The project completion contract requires full typecheck, lint, test, and build evidence
Rejected: Leave warning/info diagnostics as historical noise | they obscure future gate regressions and weaken flow-impact claims
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep repository gate cleanup separate from feature fixes when it is not part of the same runtime path
Tested: bunx biome lint src/; bunx tsc --noEmit; bun test src/services/mcp/__tests__/envExpansion.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/sliceAnsi.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/stringUtils.test.ts; bun test; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual Langfuse export against a real external Langfuse service

* fix: harden ACP failure boundaries after review

Deep review found several paths that made ACP communication failures look normal: prompt errors could finish as end_turn, permission pipeline exceptions could fall through to client approval, tool rawInput was deep-copied with JSON, and acp-link accepted unbounded or unvalidated WebSocket payloads. This keeps the behavior fail-closed, validates WS payloads before dispatch, caps payload size before JSON parse, and preserves cancellation intent with a generation counter.

Constraint: User explicitly rejected pseudo-fixes, fallback behavior, and unbounded payload handling

Rejected: Keep JSON stringify/parse rawInput copy | duplicates large payloads and silently drops non-JSON inputs

Rejected: Delegate permission pipeline errors to client approval | allows a broken local permission check to be bypassed

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Do not convert ACP errors into normal end_turn responses without a protocol-level reason and regression tests

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: bunx biome lint src/ packages/acp-link/src/

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run build

Not-tested: Manual end-to-end ACP client session over a real editor WebSocket

* fix: prevent ACP coverage runs from seeing partial mocks

GitHub Actions failed under bun test --coverage because permissions.test.ts replaced ../bridge.js with a partial mock that omitted forwardSessionUpdates. Coverage worker ordering on Linux let sibling tests observe that incomplete module.

This isolates ACP test mocks by snapshotting real exports, overriding only requested symbols, and restoring mocks in LIFO order. The shared helper also keeps the same behavior in agent.test.ts without duplicating mock infrastructure.

Constraint: bun:test mock.module is process-global inside a worker.

Rejected: Add fallback exports or production guards | the bridge export exists; the failure was test mock pollution.

Rejected: Keep per-file helper copies | duplication would let restore semantics drift again.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Prefer safeMockModule for partial mocks of real modules in ACP tests; plain mock.module is only appropriate for fully synthetic modules or isolated tests.

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: git diff --check

Not-tested: Linux runner directly before push

* fix: normalize ACP bypass requests without warning noise

The previous CI repair removed the failing partial bridge mock, but it also added a shared safeMockModule helper and left the acp-link bypass normalization warning in the real new_session path.

This tightens the fix: acp-link now treats an unauthorized client bypass request as normal permission-mode normalization without emitting a warning, and the ACP permission test explicitly preserves the real bridge and permission exports instead of using a shared helper. The agent test keeps its local mock preservation but names it by behavior and restores mocks in LIFO order.

Constraint: CI output should not contain expected warning noise for covered policy branches.

Rejected: Silence the test only | the normal new_session path would still warn for an expected normalization branch.

Rejected: Keep the shared safeMockModule helper | the failing module was specific and should be fixed by preserving real exports at the mocking site.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Treat client-requested bypassPermissions as data to normalize unless the local default explicitly enables bypass.

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov with UPPER_WARN_COUNT=0

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: git diff --check

* fix: harden ACP bypass and CI warning gates

ACP clients must not be able to enter bypassPermissions unless the local ACP gate and process environment both allow it. The same gate now controls session creation, explicit mode changes, and the ExitPlanMode option list, while session setup restores process.cwd so coverage and later work do not inherit ACP session state.

Constraint: CI must stay warning-clean without hiding real ACP permission failures

Rejected: Logging rejected bypass requests on the normal new_session path | it preserves audit text but reintroduces warning noise the runtime should not emit

Rejected: Broad CI=true postinstall skip | it hides explicit Chrome MCP setup checks outside the install path

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Keep bypassPermissions gated through one ACP availability decision before exposing it to clients

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage produced non-empty lcov with SF records and zero filtered warning matches

Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push

* fix: remove remaining CI warning noise

The CI log still had three non-failing warnings after the ACP hardening commit: git init default-branch advice from checkout, a Node 20 action-runtime deprecation, and one additional known Vite dynamic-import diagnostic that only surfaced on Linux. The workflow now provides explicit git config and opts actions into Node 24, while Vite keeps a narrow allowlist for acknowledged optimizer diagnostics.

Constraint: Do not use shell log filtering to hide warnings after they happen

Rejected: Grep warning lines out of CI output | it would make future diagnostics harder to find

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Add new Vite warning allowlist entries only after checking that they are existing optimizer diagnostics, not new application defects

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bunx biome lint .github/workflows/ci.yml vite.config.ts

Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches

Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push

* fix: reject unauthorized ACP bypass and harden CI actions

ACP clients now fail closed when permissionMode is malformed, unknown, or requests bypass without a local bypass opt-in. acp-link validates new_session input before forwarding to the agent and returns client error frames for expected unauthorized requests without logging create-failed noise. The direct AcpAgent path independently rejects invalid _meta.permissionMode and unauthorized bypass instead of falling back to settings.

CI workflows and generated GitHub App templates now use Node 24-compatible actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs, and acp-link startup output no longer prints the auth token.

Constraint: Must not hide warnings with test isolation or log filtering

Rejected: Silent fallback to local permission mode | accepts invalid client intent and masks boundary behavior

Rejected: Broad dependency churn from bun update | audit remained failing while package and lockfile churn expanded scope

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Client-provided permissionMode must stay fail-closed before reaching AcpAgent; only local settings.defaultMode may fall back to default on invalid local config

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/skillLearning/__tests__/skillLifecycle.test.ts src/utils/settings/__tests__/config.test.ts

Tested: bunx tsc -p packages/acp-link/tsconfig.json --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: local CI equivalent install/typecheck/coverage/build with warning_scan=0

Not-tested: Pre-existing bun audit vulnerabilities require a separate dependency-hardening PR

* fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely

Use dependency-native upgrades and lockfile resolution to close the audit findings without suppressions. Keep the chrome MCP setup aligned with the new dependency graph and add real integration coverage so the override behavior stays verified.

Constraint: no audit ignores or warning suppression
Rejected: broad google-auth/protobuf overrides | replaced with upstream-compatible resolution
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: keep dependency fixes upstream-compatible; do not reintroduce blanket overrides unless the audit surface changes materially
Tested: bun audit; bun audit --json; bun install --frozen-lockfile with CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_CHROME_MCP_SETUP=1; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; targeted tests; bun run test:all; bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage; bun run build:vite
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks

* fix: keep ACP auth tokens out of URLs

Replace the ad hoc URL-token flow with crypto UUID-backed transport identifiers so the bearer token stays in structured request data instead of query strings. Keep the server, web client, and transport helpers aligned so the ACP/RCS handshake remains compatible after the API shape change.

Constraint: token must not be embedded in the URL
Rejected: token-as-uuid query fallback | leaked bearer tokens in URLs
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: preserve the structured auth path; do not reintroduce query-token fallback when adjusting ACP transport code
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS transport tests
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks

* fix: normalize WebFetch request headers

Normalize WebFetch headers before dispatch so canonicalization preserves auth semantics and duplicate forms do not slip through. Keep the behavior locked with a focused header test instead of broadening the request pipeline.

Constraint: preserve header semantics without widening the fetch surface
Rejected: ad hoc caller-side normalization | too easy to bypass in future call sites
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: keep header normalization close to the WebFetch utility so future callers inherit the same behavior automatically
Tested: targeted WebFetch header tests
Not-tested: unrelated fetch backend behavior beyond header normalization

* fix: harden ACP remote auth surfaces

Tighten the remaining Claude security artifact items by requiring API keys on ACP global reads and relay upgrades, moving WebSocket tokens out of URLs, and replacing open web CORS with an explicit allowlist.

Constraint: Browser WebSocket clients cannot set arbitrary Authorization headers, so the token is carried in a selected subprotocol instead of a query string.
Rejected: Keep UUID auth for ACP channel groups | any caller can mint a UUID and read global ACP data.
Rejected: Preserve ?token= compatibility | secrets leak into logs, history, referrers, and intermediaries.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not reintroduce query-string bearer tokens; use Authorization or rcs.auth.<base64url-token>.
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bun run typecheck in packages/remote-control-server
Tested: bun run build in packages/acp-link
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bun audit
Tested: focused RCS/acp-link/web tests, 160 pass
Tested: Edge headless browser WebSocket subprotocol handshake
Tested: bun run test:all, 3669 pass
Tested: bun run build:vite
Tested: bun run build
Not-tested: Manual end-to-end relay with a live external ACP agent

* fix: resolve CI dependency override lookup

The CI runner does not expose @grpc/proto-loader as a root-resolvable package, and the test was relying on local hoisting rather than the real dependency owner. Resolve proto-loader through @opentelemetry/exporter-trace-otlp-grpc and @grpc/grpc-js so the smoke test follows the package graph it is validating.

Constraint: Do not add a new root dependency for a transitive smoke test.

Rejected: Skip or weaken the test | the test protects the protobuf 7 override path and should keep exercising loadSync.

Rejected: Add @grpc/proto-loader directly to root package.json | that hides the owning-package resolution issue and broadens dependency surface.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Dependency override smoke tests should resolve from the package that actually owns the dependency, not from incidental root hoisting.

Tested: bun test tests/integration/dependency-overrides.test.ts; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; bun audit; bun run test:all; git diff --check

---------

Co-authored-by: unraid <local@unraid.local>
2026-04-26 19:49:54 +08:00

793 lines
25 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Portable session storage utilities.
*
* Pure Node.js — no internal dependencies on logging, experiments, or feature
* flags. Shared between the CLI (src/utils/sessionStorage.ts) and the VS Code
* extension (packages/claude-vscode/src/common-host/sessionStorage.ts).
*/
import type { UUID } from 'crypto'
import { open as fsOpen, readdir, realpath, stat } from 'fs/promises'
import { join } from 'path'
import { getClaudeConfigHomeDir } from './envUtils.js'
import { getWorktreePathsPortable } from './getWorktreePathsPortable.js'
import { djb2Hash } from './hash.js'
/** Size of the head/tail buffer for lite metadata reads. */
export const LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE = 65536
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// UUID validation
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const uuidRegex =
/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
export function validateUuid(maybeUuid: unknown): UUID | null {
if (typeof maybeUuid !== 'string') return null
return uuidRegex.test(maybeUuid) ? (maybeUuid as UUID) : null
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// JSON string field extraction — no full parse, works on truncated lines
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Unescape a JSON string value extracted as raw text.
* Only allocates a new string when escape sequences are present.
*/
export function unescapeJsonString(raw: string): string {
if (!raw.includes('\\')) return raw
try {
return JSON.parse(`"${raw}"`)
} catch {
return raw
}
}
/**
* Extracts a simple JSON string field value from raw text without full parsing.
* Looks for `"key":"value"` or `"key": "value"` patterns.
* Returns the first match, or undefined if not found.
*/
export function extractJsonStringField(
text: string,
key: string,
): string | undefined {
const patterns = [`"${key}":"`, `"${key}": "`]
for (const pattern of patterns) {
const idx = text.indexOf(pattern)
if (idx < 0) continue
const valueStart = idx + pattern.length
let i = valueStart
while (i < text.length) {
if (text[i] === '\\') {
i += 2
continue
}
if (text[i] === '"') {
return unescapeJsonString(text.slice(valueStart, i))
}
i++
}
}
return undefined
}
/**
* Like extractJsonStringField but finds the LAST occurrence.
* Useful for fields that are appended (customTitle, tag, etc.).
*/
export function extractLastJsonStringField(
text: string,
key: string,
): string | undefined {
const patterns = [`"${key}":"`, `"${key}": "`]
let lastValue: string | undefined
for (const pattern of patterns) {
let searchFrom = 0
while (true) {
const idx = text.indexOf(pattern, searchFrom)
if (idx < 0) break
const valueStart = idx + pattern.length
let i = valueStart
while (i < text.length) {
if (text[i] === '\\') {
i += 2
continue
}
if (text[i] === '"') {
lastValue = unescapeJsonString(text.slice(valueStart, i))
break
}
i++
}
searchFrom = i + 1
}
}
return lastValue
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// First prompt extraction from head chunk
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Pattern matching auto-generated or system messages that should be skipped
* when looking for the first meaningful user prompt. Matches anything that
* starts with a lowercase XML-like tag (IDE context, hook output, task
* notifications, channel messages, etc.) or a synthetic interrupt marker.
*/
const SKIP_FIRST_PROMPT_PATTERN =
/^(?:\s*<[a-z][\w-]*[\s>]|\[Request interrupted by user[^\]]*\])/
const COMMAND_NAME_RE = /<command-name>(.*?)<\/command-name>/
/**
* Extracts the first meaningful user prompt from a JSONL head chunk.
*
* Skips tool_result messages, isMeta, isCompactSummary, command-name messages,
* and auto-generated patterns (session hooks, tick, IDE metadata, etc.).
* Truncates to 200 chars.
*/
export function extractFirstPromptFromHead(head: string): string {
let start = 0
let commandFallback = ''
while (start < head.length) {
const newlineIdx = head.indexOf('\n', start)
const line =
newlineIdx >= 0 ? head.slice(start, newlineIdx) : head.slice(start)
start = newlineIdx >= 0 ? newlineIdx + 1 : head.length
if (!line.includes('"type":"user"') && !line.includes('"type": "user"'))
continue
if (line.includes('"tool_result"')) continue
if (line.includes('"isMeta":true') || line.includes('"isMeta": true'))
continue
if (
line.includes('"isCompactSummary":true') ||
line.includes('"isCompactSummary": true')
)
continue
try {
const entry = JSON.parse(line) as Record<string, unknown>
if (entry.type !== 'user') continue
const message = entry.message as Record<string, unknown> | undefined
if (!message) continue
const content = message.content
const texts: string[] = []
if (typeof content === 'string') {
texts.push(content)
} else if (Array.isArray(content)) {
for (const block of content as Record<string, unknown>[]) {
if (block.type === 'text' && typeof block.text === 'string') {
texts.push(block.text as string)
}
}
}
for (const raw of texts) {
let result = raw.replace(/\n/g, ' ').trim()
if (!result) continue
// Skip slash-command messages but remember first as fallback
const cmdMatch = COMMAND_NAME_RE.exec(result)
if (cmdMatch) {
if (!commandFallback) commandFallback = cmdMatch[1]!
continue
}
// Format bash input with ! prefix before the generic XML skip
const bashMatch = /<bash-input>([\s\S]*?)<\/bash-input>/.exec(result)
if (bashMatch) return `! ${bashMatch[1]!.trim()}`
if (SKIP_FIRST_PROMPT_PATTERN.test(result)) continue
if (result.length > 200) {
result = result.slice(0, 200).trim() + '\u2026'
}
return result
}
} catch {
}
}
if (commandFallback) return commandFallback
return ''
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// File I/O — read head and tail of a file
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Reads the first and last LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE bytes of a file.
*
* For small files where head covers tail, `tail === head`.
* Accepts a shared Buffer to avoid per-file allocation overhead.
* Returns `{ head: '', tail: '' }` on any error.
*/
export async function readHeadAndTail(
filePath: string,
fileSize: number,
buf: Buffer,
): Promise<{ head: string; tail: string }> {
try {
const fh = await fsOpen(filePath, 'r')
try {
const headResult = await fh.read(buf, 0, LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE, 0)
if (headResult.bytesRead === 0) return { head: '', tail: '' }
const head = buf.toString('utf8', 0, headResult.bytesRead)
const tailOffset = Math.max(0, fileSize - LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE)
let tail = head
if (tailOffset > 0) {
const tailResult = await fh.read(buf, 0, LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE, tailOffset)
tail = buf.toString('utf8', 0, tailResult.bytesRead)
}
return { head, tail }
} finally {
await fh.close()
}
} catch {
return { head: '', tail: '' }
}
}
export type LiteSessionFile = {
mtime: number
size: number
head: string
tail: string
}
/**
* Opens a single session file, stats it, and reads head + tail in one fd.
* Allocates its own buffer — safe for concurrent use with Promise.all.
* Returns null on any error.
*/
export async function readSessionLite(
filePath: string,
): Promise<LiteSessionFile | null> {
try {
const fh = await fsOpen(filePath, 'r')
try {
const stat = await fh.stat()
const buf = Buffer.allocUnsafe(LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE)
const headResult = await fh.read(buf, 0, LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE, 0)
if (headResult.bytesRead === 0) return null
const head = buf.toString('utf8', 0, headResult.bytesRead)
const tailOffset = Math.max(0, stat.size - LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE)
let tail = head
if (tailOffset > 0) {
const tailResult = await fh.read(buf, 0, LITE_READ_BUF_SIZE, tailOffset)
tail = buf.toString('utf8', 0, tailResult.bytesRead)
}
return { mtime: stat.mtime.getTime(), size: stat.size, head, tail }
} finally {
await fh.close()
}
} catch {
return null
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Path sanitization
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Maximum length for a single filesystem path component (directory or file name).
* Most filesystems (ext4, APFS, NTFS) limit individual components to 255 bytes.
* We use 200 to leave room for the hash suffix and separator.
*/
export const MAX_SANITIZED_LENGTH = 200
function simpleHash(str: string): string {
return Math.abs(djb2Hash(str)).toString(36)
}
/**
* Makes a string safe for use as a directory or file name.
* Replaces all non-alphanumeric characters with hyphens.
* This ensures compatibility across all platforms, including Windows
* where characters like colons are reserved.
*
* For deeply nested paths that would exceed filesystem limits (255 bytes),
* truncates and appends a hash suffix for uniqueness.
*
* @param name - The string to make safe (e.g., '/Users/foo/my-project' or 'plugin:name:server')
* @returns A safe name (e.g., '-Users-foo-my-project' or 'plugin-name-server')
*/
export function sanitizePath(name: string): string {
const sanitized = name.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, '-')
if (sanitized.length <= MAX_SANITIZED_LENGTH) {
return sanitized
}
const hash =
typeof Bun !== 'undefined' ? Bun.hash(name).toString(36) : simpleHash(name)
return `${sanitized.slice(0, MAX_SANITIZED_LENGTH)}-${hash}`
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Project directory discovery (shared by listSessions & getSessionMessages)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export function getProjectsDir(): string {
return join(getClaudeConfigHomeDir(), 'projects')
}
export function getProjectDir(projectDir: string): string {
return join(getProjectsDir(), sanitizePath(projectDir))
}
/**
* Resolves a directory path to its canonical form using realpath + NFC
* normalization. Falls back to NFC-only if realpath fails (e.g., the
* directory doesn't exist yet). Ensures symlinked paths (e.g.,
* /tmp → /private/tmp on macOS) resolve to the same project directory.
*/
export async function canonicalizePath(dir: string): Promise<string> {
try {
return (await realpath(dir)).normalize('NFC')
} catch {
return dir.normalize('NFC')
}
}
/**
* Finds the project directory for a given path, tolerating hash mismatches
* for long paths (>200 chars). The CLI uses Bun.hash while the SDK under
* Node.js uses simpleHash — for paths that exceed MAX_SANITIZED_LENGTH,
* these produce different directory suffixes. This function falls back to
* prefix-based scanning when the exact match doesn't exist.
*/
export async function findProjectDir(
projectPath: string,
): Promise<string | undefined> {
const exact = getProjectDir(projectPath)
try {
await readdir(exact)
return exact
} catch {
// Exact match failed — for short paths this means no sessions exist.
// For long paths, try prefix matching to handle hash mismatches.
const sanitized = sanitizePath(projectPath)
if (sanitized.length <= MAX_SANITIZED_LENGTH) {
return undefined
}
const prefix = sanitized.slice(0, MAX_SANITIZED_LENGTH)
const projectsDir = getProjectsDir()
try {
const dirents = await readdir(projectsDir, { withFileTypes: true })
const match = dirents.find(
d => d.isDirectory() && d.name.startsWith(prefix + '-'),
)
return match ? join(projectsDir, match.name) : undefined
} catch {
return undefined
}
}
}
/**
* Resolve a sessionId to its on-disk JSONL file path.
*
* When `dir` is provided: canonicalize it, look in that project's directory
* (with findProjectDir fallback for Bun/Node hash mismatches), then fall back
* to sibling git worktrees. `projectPath` in the result is the canonical
* user-facing directory the file was found under.
*
* When `dir` is omitted: scan all project directories under ~/.claude/projects/.
* `projectPath` is undefined in this case (no meaningful project path to report).
*
* Existence is checked by stat (operate-then-catch-ENOENT, no existsSync).
* Zero-byte files are treated as not-found so callers continue searching past
* a truncated copy to find a valid one in a sibling directory.
*
* `fileSize` is returned so callers (loadSessionBuffer) don't need to re-stat.
*
* Shared by getSessionInfoImpl and getSessionMessagesImpl — the caller
* invokes its own reader (readSessionLite / loadSessionBuffer) on the
* resolved path.
*/
export async function resolveSessionFilePath(
sessionId: string,
dir?: string,
): Promise<
| { filePath: string; projectPath: string | undefined; fileSize: number }
| undefined
> {
const fileName = `${sessionId}.jsonl`
if (dir) {
const canonical = await canonicalizePath(dir)
const projectDir = await findProjectDir(canonical)
if (projectDir) {
const filePath = join(projectDir, fileName)
try {
const s = await stat(filePath)
if (s.size > 0)
return { filePath, projectPath: canonical, fileSize: s.size }
} catch {
// ENOENT/EACCES — keep searching
}
}
// Worktree fallback — sessions may live under a different worktree root
let worktreePaths: string[]
try {
worktreePaths = await getWorktreePathsPortable(canonical)
} catch {
worktreePaths = []
}
for (const wt of worktreePaths) {
if (wt === canonical) continue
const wtProjectDir = await findProjectDir(wt)
if (!wtProjectDir) continue
const filePath = join(wtProjectDir, fileName)
try {
const s = await stat(filePath)
if (s.size > 0) return { filePath, projectPath: wt, fileSize: s.size }
} catch {
// ENOENT/EACCES — keep searching
}
}
return undefined
}
// No dir — scan all project directories
const projectsDir = getProjectsDir()
let dirents: string[]
try {
dirents = await readdir(projectsDir)
} catch {
return undefined
}
for (const name of dirents) {
const filePath = join(projectsDir, name, fileName)
try {
const s = await stat(filePath)
if (s.size > 0)
return { filePath, projectPath: undefined, fileSize: s.size }
} catch {
// ENOENT/ENOTDIR — not in this project, keep scanning
}
}
return undefined
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Compact-boundary chunked read (shared by loadTranscriptFile & SDK getSessionMessages)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Chunk size for the forward transcript reader. 1 MB balances I/O calls vs buffer growth. */
const TRANSCRIPT_READ_CHUNK_SIZE = 1024 * 1024
/**
* File size below which precompact filtering is skipped.
* Large sessions (>5 MB) almost always have compact boundaries — they got big
* because of many turns triggering auto-compact.
*/
export const SKIP_PRECOMPACT_THRESHOLD = 5 * 1024 * 1024
/** Marker bytes searched for when locating the boundary. Lazy: allocated on
* first use, not at module load. Most sessions never resume. */
let _compactBoundaryMarker: Buffer | undefined
function compactBoundaryMarker(): Buffer {
return (_compactBoundaryMarker ??= Buffer.from('"compact_boundary"'))
}
/**
* Confirm a byte-matched line is a real compact_boundary (marker can appear
* inside user content) and check for preservedSegment.
*/
function parseBoundaryLine(
line: string,
): { hasPreservedSegment: boolean } | null {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(line) as {
type?: string
subtype?: string
compactMetadata?: { preservedSegment?: unknown }
}
if (parsed.type !== 'system' || parsed.subtype !== 'compact_boundary') {
return null
}
return {
hasPreservedSegment: Boolean(parsed.compactMetadata?.preservedSegment),
}
} catch {
return null
}
}
/**
* Single forward chunked read for the --resume load path. Attr-snap lines
* are skipped at the fd level; compact boundaries truncate in-stream. Peak
* is the output size, not the file size.
*
* The surviving (last) attr-snap is appended at EOF instead of in-place;
* restoreAttributionStateFromSnapshots only reads [length-1] so position
* doesn't matter.
*/
type Sink = { buf: Buffer; len: number; cap: number }
function sinkWrite(s: Sink, src: Buffer, start: number, end: number): void {
const n = end - start
if (n <= 0) return
if (s.len + n > s.buf.length) {
const grown = Buffer.allocUnsafe(
Math.min(Math.max(s.buf.length * 2, s.len + n), s.cap),
)
s.buf.copy(grown, 0, 0, s.len)
s.buf = grown
}
src.copy(s.buf, s.len, start, end)
s.len += n
}
function hasPrefix(
src: Buffer,
prefix: Buffer,
at: number,
end: number,
): boolean {
return (
end - at >= prefix.length &&
src.compare(prefix, 0, prefix.length, at, at + prefix.length) === 0
)
}
const ATTR_SNAP_PREFIX = Buffer.from('{"type":"attribution-snapshot"')
const SYSTEM_PREFIX = Buffer.from('{"type":"system"')
const LF = 0x0a
const LF_BYTE = Buffer.from([LF])
const BOUNDARY_SEARCH_BOUND = 256 // marker sits ~28 bytes in; 256 is slack
type LoadState = {
out: Sink
boundaryStartOffset: number
hasPreservedSegment: boolean
lastSnapSrc: Buffer | null // most-recent attr-snap, appended at EOF
lastSnapLen: number
lastSnapBuf: Buffer | undefined
bufFileOff: number // file offset of buf[0]
carryLen: number
carryBuf: Buffer | undefined
straddleSnapCarryLen: number // per-chunk; reset by processStraddle
straddleSnapTailEnd: number
}
// Line spanning the chunk seam. 0 = fall through to concat.
function processStraddle(
s: LoadState,
chunk: Buffer,
bytesRead: number,
): number {
s.straddleSnapCarryLen = 0
s.straddleSnapTailEnd = 0
if (s.carryLen === 0) return 0
const cb = s.carryBuf!
const firstNl = chunk.indexOf(LF)
if (firstNl === -1 || firstNl >= bytesRead) return 0
const tailEnd = firstNl + 1
if (hasPrefix(cb, ATTR_SNAP_PREFIX, 0, s.carryLen)) {
s.straddleSnapCarryLen = s.carryLen
s.straddleSnapTailEnd = tailEnd
s.lastSnapSrc = null
} else if (s.carryLen < ATTR_SNAP_PREFIX.length) {
return 0 // too short to rule out attr-snap
} else {
if (hasPrefix(cb, SYSTEM_PREFIX, 0, s.carryLen)) {
const hit = parseBoundaryLine(
cb.toString('utf-8', 0, s.carryLen) +
chunk.toString('utf-8', 0, firstNl),
)
if (hit?.hasPreservedSegment) {
s.hasPreservedSegment = true
} else if (hit) {
s.out.len = 0
s.boundaryStartOffset = s.bufFileOff
s.hasPreservedSegment = false
s.lastSnapSrc = null
}
}
sinkWrite(s.out, cb, 0, s.carryLen)
sinkWrite(s.out, chunk, 0, tailEnd)
}
s.bufFileOff += s.carryLen + tailEnd
s.carryLen = 0
return tailEnd
}
// Strip attr-snaps, truncate on boundaries. Kept lines write as runs.
function scanChunkLines(
s: LoadState,
buf: Buffer,
boundaryMarker: Buffer,
): { lastSnapStart: number; lastSnapEnd: number; trailStart: number } {
let boundaryAt = buf.indexOf(boundaryMarker)
let runStart = 0
let lineStart = 0
let lastSnapStart = -1
let lastSnapEnd = -1
let nl = buf.indexOf(LF)
while (nl !== -1) {
const lineEnd = nl + 1
if (boundaryAt !== -1 && boundaryAt < lineStart) {
boundaryAt = buf.indexOf(boundaryMarker, lineStart)
}
if (hasPrefix(buf, ATTR_SNAP_PREFIX, lineStart, lineEnd)) {
sinkWrite(s.out, buf, runStart, lineStart)
lastSnapStart = lineStart
lastSnapEnd = lineEnd
runStart = lineEnd
} else if (
boundaryAt >= lineStart &&
boundaryAt < Math.min(lineStart + BOUNDARY_SEARCH_BOUND, lineEnd)
) {
const hit = parseBoundaryLine(buf.toString('utf-8', lineStart, nl))
if (hit?.hasPreservedSegment) {
s.hasPreservedSegment = true // don't truncate; preserved msgs already in output
} else if (hit) {
s.out.len = 0
s.boundaryStartOffset = s.bufFileOff + lineStart
s.hasPreservedSegment = false
s.lastSnapSrc = null
lastSnapStart = -1
s.straddleSnapCarryLen = 0
runStart = lineStart
}
boundaryAt = buf.indexOf(
boundaryMarker,
boundaryAt + boundaryMarker.length,
)
}
lineStart = lineEnd
nl = buf.indexOf(LF, lineStart)
}
sinkWrite(s.out, buf, runStart, lineStart)
return { lastSnapStart, lastSnapEnd, trailStart: lineStart }
}
// In-buf snap wins over straddle (later in file). carryBuf still valid here.
function captureSnap(
s: LoadState,
buf: Buffer,
chunk: Buffer,
lastSnapStart: number,
lastSnapEnd: number,
): void {
if (lastSnapStart !== -1) {
s.lastSnapLen = lastSnapEnd - lastSnapStart
if (s.lastSnapBuf === undefined || s.lastSnapLen > s.lastSnapBuf.length) {
s.lastSnapBuf = Buffer.allocUnsafe(s.lastSnapLen)
}
buf.copy(s.lastSnapBuf, 0, lastSnapStart, lastSnapEnd)
s.lastSnapSrc = s.lastSnapBuf
} else if (s.straddleSnapCarryLen > 0) {
s.lastSnapLen = s.straddleSnapCarryLen + s.straddleSnapTailEnd
if (s.lastSnapBuf === undefined || s.lastSnapLen > s.lastSnapBuf.length) {
s.lastSnapBuf = Buffer.allocUnsafe(s.lastSnapLen)
}
s.carryBuf!.copy(s.lastSnapBuf, 0, 0, s.straddleSnapCarryLen)
chunk.copy(s.lastSnapBuf, s.straddleSnapCarryLen, 0, s.straddleSnapTailEnd)
s.lastSnapSrc = s.lastSnapBuf
}
}
function captureCarry(s: LoadState, buf: Buffer, trailStart: number): void {
s.carryLen = buf.length - trailStart
if (s.carryLen > 0) {
if (s.carryBuf === undefined || s.carryLen > s.carryBuf.length) {
s.carryBuf = Buffer.allocUnsafe(s.carryLen)
}
buf.copy(s.carryBuf, 0, trailStart, buf.length)
}
}
function finalizeOutput(s: LoadState): void {
if (s.carryLen > 0) {
const cb = s.carryBuf!
if (hasPrefix(cb, ATTR_SNAP_PREFIX, 0, s.carryLen)) {
s.lastSnapSrc = cb
s.lastSnapLen = s.carryLen
} else {
sinkWrite(s.out, cb, 0, s.carryLen)
}
}
if (s.lastSnapSrc) {
if (s.out.len > 0 && s.out.buf[s.out.len - 1] !== LF) {
sinkWrite(s.out, LF_BYTE, 0, 1)
}
sinkWrite(s.out, s.lastSnapSrc, 0, s.lastSnapLen)
}
}
export async function readTranscriptForLoad(
filePath: string,
fileSize: number,
): Promise<{
boundaryStartOffset: number
postBoundaryBuf: Buffer
hasPreservedSegment: boolean
}> {
const boundaryMarker = compactBoundaryMarker()
const CHUNK_SIZE = TRANSCRIPT_READ_CHUNK_SIZE
const s: LoadState = {
out: {
// Gated callers enter with fileSize > 5MB, so min(fileSize, 8MB) lands
// in [5, 8]MB; large boundaryless sessions (24-31MB output) take 2
// grows. Ungated callers (attribution.ts) pass small files too — the
// min just right-sizes the initial buf, no grows.
buf: Buffer.allocUnsafe(Math.min(fileSize, 8 * 1024 * 1024)),
len: 0,
// +1: finalizeOutput may insert one LF between a non-LF-terminated
// carry and the reordered last attr-snap (crash-truncated file).
cap: fileSize + 1,
},
boundaryStartOffset: 0,
hasPreservedSegment: false,
lastSnapSrc: null,
lastSnapLen: 0,
lastSnapBuf: undefined,
bufFileOff: 0,
carryLen: 0,
carryBuf: undefined,
straddleSnapCarryLen: 0,
straddleSnapTailEnd: 0,
}
const chunk = Buffer.allocUnsafe(CHUNK_SIZE)
const fd = await fsOpen(filePath, 'r')
try {
let filePos = 0
while (filePos < fileSize) {
const { bytesRead } = await fd.read(
chunk,
0,
Math.min(CHUNK_SIZE, fileSize - filePos),
filePos,
)
if (bytesRead === 0) break
filePos += bytesRead
const chunkOff = processStraddle(s, chunk, bytesRead)
let buf: Buffer
if (s.carryLen > 0) {
const bufLen = s.carryLen + (bytesRead - chunkOff)
buf = Buffer.allocUnsafe(bufLen)
s.carryBuf!.copy(buf, 0, 0, s.carryLen)
chunk.copy(buf, s.carryLen, chunkOff, bytesRead)
} else {
buf = chunk.subarray(chunkOff, bytesRead)
}
const r = scanChunkLines(s, buf, boundaryMarker)
captureSnap(s, buf, chunk, r.lastSnapStart, r.lastSnapEnd)
captureCarry(s, buf, r.trailStart)
s.bufFileOff += r.trailStart
}
finalizeOutput(s)
} finally {
await fd.close()
}
return {
boundaryStartOffset: s.boundaryStartOffset,
postBoundaryBuf: s.out.buf.subarray(0, s.out.len),
hasPreservedSegment: s.hasPreservedSegment,
}
}